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Abstract 
This paper examines the arguments raised by scholars on the comparative advantages of the 
stock-market capitalism and Anglo-American ‘shareholder’ system for corporate governance and 
the ‘relational-insider’ system of the welfare capitalism in Germany and Japan, and whether the 
‘superiority’ of the former may be based on false assumptions of the sources for productivity 
growth and managerial efficiency. It is an established fact in the literature that specific 
governance relations exist in different markets, and the mechanisms for financing and co-
ordination of business operations and control of assets and resources are shaped by the local 
institutional environment. The modern corporation in its present organisational form is a 
multinational enterprise that in most cases controls assets in multiple markets, and is therefore 
tied in contractual relationships with local governments, suppliers, customers, and institutions 
beyond the reach of its home governance structure. The adversarial competitive relationships in 
one market are not replicated in another, where different context of the competitive environment 
applies. 
 
The paper offers two cases of corporate networks (the Japanese Keiretsu and Sogo-Sosha) that 
differ from the multidivisional form (M-form) of organization. The analysis of the cases tests 
some of the premises established in the corporate governance debate and leads to conclusions that 
governance, control and co-ordination mechanisms focused on interdependent relationships and 
optimization strategies generate specific advantages in the value-creation process.  
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Introduction 
Most of the discussion on corporate governance has been driven by the scholarship research that 
focuses attention on the Anglo-American corporate system based on publicly traded assets, 
distributed ownership, separation of ownership from control at corporate level, and the 
distribution of rents among investors and other residual claimants. The discussion has been 
dominated by concerns with the effectiveness of the Boards of Directors that are supposed to 
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represent shareholders’ interests, and to exercise a monitoring and control function against the 
opportunistic behaviour of managers. The development of the shareholder system has been 
sought mainly through alignment of the interests between managers and shareholders and 
improvement of the information asymmetry between them. The present crisis of the system is 
attributed mainly to weak Boards and lack of independency of the outside directors in order to 
exercise their governing role (Gupta, 2002). The remedy of the system is sought to be enhanced 
by more active regulatory intervention on behalf of government, regulators, stock exchanges self-
regulation, and positive action of the corporations themselves to enhance transparency and re-
build the trust with their stakeholders.  
 
This discussion ignores the fact that the modern corporation in its present form is a multinational 
enterprise in most cases, it controls assets in multiple markets, and it is therefore tied in 
contractual relationships with multiple host-governments and local suppliers, customers and 
institutions beyond the reach of its home governance structure. Therefore, the adversarial 
competitive relationships in one market are not replicated in another, where different context of 
the competitive environment applies. 
 
Another critical question often omitted from the discussion on corporate governance is the scale 
of operations of the multinational corporation (MNC). The very fact that some large multinational 
firms have annual turnover exceeding the budget expenditure of developed national economies 
such as Belgium, or Italy suggests that the scale of co-ordination and control within a 
multinational enterprise is at the level of co-ordination and control of economic activities within 
nation states. The issues of governance therefore have to be addressed also at the level of public 
administration, accountability, and power relations between agents that constitute the complex 
system of operational units, owned or controlled by the multinational corporation (MNC), all 
embedded in the institutional environment of their location. 
 
The debate on corporate governance also has not benefited much from comparative analysis of 
the institutional arrangements that have shaped MNC from different countries and socio-
economic systems. The work by Sanford Jacoby (2000) is one of the exceptions that informs this 
perspective, and reaches the conclusions that the ‘superiority’ of the stock-market capitalism and 
Anglo-American ‘shareholder’ system for financing and control of global corporate activities 
over the ‘relational-insider’ system of the welfare capitalism in Germany and Japan may be based 
on false assumptions of the sources for productivity growth and managerial efficiency. 
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This paper will not focus on definitional arguments concerning corporate governance. We accept 
that there is no consensus over what corporate governance is, but there is significant implicit and 
common understanding of the concept that derives mainly from agency theory, transaction cost 
economics and stakeholder theory. According to this body of knowledge (Solomon, et.al., 2004), 
corporate governance refers to: 
- a process of supervision and control over company management; 
- economic agents giving overall direction to firms; 
- the sum of control and co-ordination activities that compose of the internal regulation of 
business in compliance with external obligations; 
- the system by which companies are directed and controlled; 
- the system of external and internal checks and balances that ensures companies discharge 
their accountability to stakeholders (Tricker, 1984, The Cadbury Report, 1992, Cannon, 
1994, Parkinson, 1994, Solomon, et.al., 2004). 
 
In our analysis we will assume that corporate governance is a system / mechanism for allocation 
of resources, control and co-ordination of economic activities at firm level that facilitates 
strategic direction, accountability, transparency and wealth creation. Economic growth, 
productivity and efficiency are all seen as deriving from this wealth creation, and in the context 
of increasing corporate social responsibility and accountability. On these grounds this paper 
attempts to address the question on efficiency, scope and scale of governance by examining the 
institutional arrangements that govern two distinctive corporate networks taken in the context of a 
single regulatory regime in Japan. A comparison of the Japanese Keiretsu network corporations 
and Sogo-Shosha networks tests most of the premises established in the corporate governance 
debate, and offers two cases of corporate networks that differ from the Anglo-American 
multidivisional form (M-form) of organization, and both resemble large scale MNCs geared for 
growth. 
 
The ‘Classical’ Theory of Corporate Governance 
The observations of the paradoxes of power and control at the level of the modern corporation 
refer back to Berle & Means (1965) and their work on the consequences from the separation of 
ownership and control. Fligstein and Freeland (1995) stylise from the literature three internal 
control problems and even wider range of external control issues that extend the debate beyond 
the unbundling of ownership and control. The authors argue that the corporation may encounter 
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tensions and conflicts of interests in each of these relationships: 1) the control relationship 
between management and workers, 2) relationship between management and shareholders; 3) 
division of labour and the subsequent division of power and responsibilities within the 
corporation or intra-corporate intra-management relationships, 4) relationship with investors and 
capital markets, 5) relationships with suppliers, 6) relationships with competitors, 7) relationships 
with the state, with governments and other public institutions. One may only speculate how each 
of these relationships could act as an important contributor to the increase or decrease of 
corporate productivity and performance. The obsession in the literature therefore with the 
problems associated with investors’ control that derive from the unbundling of ownership and 
control (Blair, 1995a, Castanias, 2001, Gupta, 2002) is much more about the redistribution of 
rents among shareholders and residual claimants, rather then about improving corporate 
performance, enhancing corporate capabilities, and capturing the value added by different 
corporate agents.  
 
If we look at the corporate governance as a mechanism for allocation of resources in the economy 
and for creating value-added, then we need to consider all relations between economic agents that 
are critical in determining productivity and efficiency. The relations between shareholders and 
managers (ownership and control) no doubt are fundamental to financing corporate growth. So 
are the other relations from Fligstein and Freeland’s list. Shareholders and Investment Fund 
managers need to have trust in the working of capital markets in order to make their funds 
available. Managers and workers and all other actors involved intra-management and intra-
corporate relations need to have consent over the operations and the strategic directions of the 
firm in order to expropriate the invested capital in the most efficient way. Relations with 
suppliers are critical to achieve superior quality and to increase competitive advantage. Relations 
with government are critical for the legitimacy of the corporate activities and therefore affecting 
relations with all other stakeholders. Even relations with competitors are important for 
determining industry standards and as a form of self-regulation, avoiding costly and deadly 
collisions in the market place, and co-ordination the direction of product and process innovation. 
 
The efficiency arguments that derive from the neo-classical economic theory commence with the 
assumption that shareholders are these entrepreneurs that invest their capital in efficient manner, 
and managers are another type of entrepreneurs, that take risk and make strategic decisions 
through which they achieve the ultimate corporate objectives for enhanced performance and 
profitability. The evidence of the source of efficiency in this scenario is very inconclusive. 
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Neither corporate performance is a direct evidence of efficient allocation of financial resources, 
nor are profitability and share price an evidence for efficient risk taking and managerial co-
ordination of value-added activities. Corporate performance is directly affected by environmental 
factors, market conditions, and relationships with customers and suppliers before it get noticed 
and sanctioned by the governance structure. Profitability and share price also are affected first by 
the market conditions, and then by the governance mechanisms. 
 
Economic growth is affected not only by the mechanisms of financing and control, i.e. a 
particular corporate governance system, but also by market conditions and location advantages in 
international business operations of the MNCs. Therefore economic performance of an MNC is a 
function of both governance and strategic decision making. Wealth creation for shareholders and 
stakeholders is a derivative of economic performance of the MNC, and therefore will be hugely 
dependent on the intra-firm and inter-firm structures and relationships that facilitate decision-
making and decision implementation. Any comparative analysis of corporate governance systems 
and models ultimately has to descend to the level of relations, structures, and systems of strategic 
decision-making and decision implementation in order to reflect on the sources of productivity 
and wealth creation. 
 
Both issues - the separation of ownership from control and the creation of intra-corporate 
hierarchies - create conflict of interests between different corporate agents, and both generate 
sources of inefficiencies, by allowing politics to take place in the process of managing corporate 
resources. The outcomes of the political process inside the corporation is a critical factor 
determining corporate performance before it gets to the accounts seen by independent directors at 
the Board.  
 
Independent political processes take place simultaneously inside the corporation (affecting 
decision making and decision implementation), inside the Boardroom (affecting the function of 
the independent directors and the entire Board as an institution), and inside investment funds 
(affecting investors’ attitudes and the certainty of capital supply). Clearly political processes 
affect not only the allocation of capital to productive assets, but also the efficient expropriation of 
this capital for wealth creation. The argument that stock markets prevent the influence of political 
factors on the allocative decisions in the context described above is at least imprecise. The 
assumption that derives from this argument, that the stock-market capitalism is the most effective 
way of financing economic growth and wealth creation has to be questioned at least. 
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Another argument that has been raised to support the superiority of stock-market capitalism is the 
question of transparency and information supply/sharing between economic actors. If we take 
Herbert Simon’s (1957) modification of the neoclassical assumption of perfectly rational 
economic actors, there is a clear statement of the existence of informational asymmetries and the 
problem of incomplete information. If we add to this problem the cognitive and political 
constraints experienced by economic actors (independent directors on the Board of Directors, 
Investment Fund managers accountable to Fund owners, managers in industrial relations dispute, 
or corporate representatives in difficult negotiations with buyers and suppliers), the efficiency 
argument is further weakened. The main efficiency enhancing elements of the corporation that 
remain are the individual contractual obligations (when contracts are enforceable under strong 
and efficient state), and efficient organizational processes and procedures for coordinating the 
value added activities (in the hands of insider stakeholders). If we accept that the state and inside 
stakeholders contribute to strong governance in the home market, this raises a major question 
over the governance of subsidiaries abroad where host governments vary in the capability to 
secure contract enforcement, and insiders are embedded in local set of relations. The discussion 
above can be synthesized in the following conceptual framework (Fig.1.). 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Factors Affecting the Corporate Governance System: A Conceptual Framework 
Corporate Governance
A system / mechanism for allocation 
of capital and corporate resources, 
for co-ordination and control of economic 
activities at firm level that facilitates:
strategic direction
accountability
transparency
wealth creation
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Market
conditions
Political processes:
Inter- intra-Board
Inter-intra-corporate
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shareholders & 
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Relationships with
customers & suppliers
Information asymmetries
Strategic decision-making & 
implementation processes
Efficient organisational
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Intra-firm 
monitoring 
& control
Individual
contractual obligations
Contract enforcement
practices
Continuous innovation & 
transformation of technologies
Impact of knowledge & 
learning on strategic choices
Path - dependence
Endogeneity & reflexivity of 
human preferences
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In addition to contract enforcement practices and insider stakeholder relations, the productivity 
and cost effectiveness is fundamentally determined by the organisational structures put in place, 
technologies and innovation practices. It is the organizational structure in Willianson’s view 
(1975, 1988, 1991) that economises on transaction costs, rather then the governance structure. 
The governance structure has evolved merely as a substitute to compensate for the inefficiencies 
that emerge from the separation between the ownership and control. It can be assumed that the 
Board of Directors in whatever shape it is would not bring value added to the corporation, unless 
it takes direct responsibilities over strategic decision making and implementation. Its monitoring 
and control function does not enhance corporate performance, and may not add value. 
Sanctioning managers for opportunistic behaviour is not a value adding activity by itself, but a 
final resort when crisis is imminent. The true value-adding activities derive from the co-ordinated 
actions of managers, workers, investors, suppliers and customers among other stakeholders 
whose influence is observed not only in terms of corporate performance, but also in terms of 
effectiveness of decision making and co-ordination efficiencies. 
 
The agency theory substantiates most of these arguments on efficient governance. Considering 
that the corporation is a bundle of contracts, the contracts between managers and shareholders is 
not different from the contract between the other agents involved in the value-adding activities 
(employees, customers, suppliers).  Investors as owners of stock in the stock market capitalism 
delegate decision-making powers to agents (managers and independent directors). Ultimately 
agency costs rise not only because of opportunistic behaviour by managers, but also from the 
monitoring and control mechanisms put in place by stock-holders. The entire corporate 
governance system, put in place to protect investors’ interests, represent an institutionalization of 
monitoring and control procedures, raising costs, and diminishing allocative efficiency. In mature 
market economies where contract enforcement is undertaken by the state, monitoring and control 
costs are shared between the MNC and state institutions. The costs of corporate governance 
however, remain at corporate level, reducing the value-added and the wealth, created by the 
corporation. For MNCs operating in underdeveloped market economies, risks from opportunistic 
behaviour at remote locations add additional agency costs that have to be absorbed by the 
multinational, and hence multiple risk-sharing initiatives are undertaken, all eroding the profits 
from these international operations. 
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Hill & Jones (1992) summarise three sources of agency costs from the perspective of agency 
theory: a) principal’s monitoring expenditure (including the design and management of corporate 
governance system, appointment and running of Board of Directors, and all types of shareholder 
activism); b) agents’ bonding expenditure (managing the intra-corporate accounting process, plus 
all risks of managing relationships with the other stakeholders); and c) residual loss 
(supplementing for risks, taken beyond the home market where specific corporate governance 
and contract enforcement exists. Contract enforcement is an issue in all types of relationships and 
all corporate governance systems. Exit strategies by customers, suppliers, employees, or indeed 
investors could harm the corporation and affect negatively its performance, even in the case of 
strong governance.  
 
The agency theory also explains the emergence of other types of business organizations along the 
joint stock corporation with M-form controlling its subsidiaries world-wide – partnerships, sole 
proprietorships, non-profit organizations and holding companies as well. Different division of 
property rights arises in alternative search for efficient deployment of financial resources under 
specific conditions (Fligstein & Freeland, 1995). Although the idea is that these specific 
conditions are related to specific agency costs (Fama & Jensen, 1983), there could be numerous 
other reasons where one form or another is particularly associated with enhanced performance 
under certain environmental conditions. 
 
The overall performance of the corporation is affected by numerous environmental factors and 
numerous agents that contribute willingly and under contractual arrangements to the value-adding 
activities. All these agents (workers, employees, middle-level managers) potentially can exit and 
withdraw their efforts, and therefore damage the corporate performance. In the political process 
of negotiating contracts between all these corporate agents residual claims to the profits may be 
raised, and therefore the allocation of rents may take place almost outside of the corporate 
governance system and subsequently off- sight from the shareholders. According to the agency 
theory, the monitoring and control activities of the Board can not secure efficient contract 
negotiations and enforcement within the corporation, and this is associated with one of the 
vulnerabilities of the stock-market capitalism. 
 
Transaction cost theory uses very similar terminology to the agency theory to describe the same 
corporate governance issues and problems (Solomon, et al., 2004). Both theories assume bounded 
rationality and opportunistic behaviour by managers. However, transaction cost theory explains 
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the conditions under which a corporation undertakes vertical and horizontal integration, adding 
new business units, and how a corporation expands its operations internationally. Both theories 
do not follow through this logic and do not explain how internationalisation of operations 
stretches the boundaries of the corporate governance system established at the home market. The 
increased scope and scale of operations ultimately transfer more strategic decision-making power 
to agents beyond the reach of the monitoring activities conducted on behalf of the ‘principle-
owners’. 
 
The institutional and evolutionary economics has also made a contribution to the debate by 
adding more questions regarding the efficiency of the Board of Directors as a governing 
institution. Both disciplines have evolved mainly as a critical theory in argument with the 
classical and neo-classical economic paradigm. In this endeavour institutional economists have 
agreed upon assumptions, systematically analysed by Hodgson, 1988), such as: 
- recognition of the importance of institutions, i.e. rules, procedures, practices and 
organisational arrangements that frame economic decisions and actions; 
- acknowledgement of the chronic information problems undermining the fundamental 
price mechanism governing market relations; 
- the habitual nature of human actions, conditioned by institutions and past legacies, or the 
well known ‘path-dependence theory’;  
- acknowledgement of the purposefulness and strategic choice in human action, or the 
ability of actors to change both their behavioural trajectories and their goals; 
- disequilibrium is the driving force behind development and growth; 
- the continuous transformation of productive and organisational technologies, impacting 
on exchanges, transactions, and decision-making; 
- a variety and a complex set of relations affecting production and exchange; 
- the preferences of economic agents are endogenous, suggesting that decision-making is a 
function of the relational context and environmental constraints embedding human 
activities and work relationships; 
- individual preferences (or motives) can be both transitive (affected by the price 
mechanism) and intransitive (an individual attribute preconditioned and determined 
within specific cognitive frameworks, and endogenously derived at). Preferences also are 
reflexive, i.e. subject to change under the acquisition of new experience, knowledge and 
learning, and individual adaptation; 
- knowledge and learning make a significant impact on decisions and human actions; 
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- the preconditions for innovation are a combination of variety (through market 
transactions) and stability (through organisational rules, institutional norms, and 
practices). The later includes institutional intervention at knowledge creation, 
dissemination and utilisation phase;  
- agents are seen to be maximising ‘expected utility’ and optimising behaviour (Hodgson, 
1988, p. 76), rather then maximising behaviour. Provided computational difficulties, 
limited information, abundance of sense data, and the sense-making communication 
process, agents are more likely to optimise towards expected utility, rather then maximise; 
- prices act as market signals only within some cognitive frames of ‘price levels’ and ‘price 
norms’ known by the individual, and established via individual observations or practical 
experience in exchange situations; 
- firms and other institutions emerge in order to eliminate the radical uncertainty that a 
signed contract will be completed, i.e. creating a compulsory framework for compliance 
(rather then a voluntary withdrawal from opportunism. 
 
Institutional and evolutionary economics challenge the fundamental assumptions behind agency 
theory. Unfortunately, very few of their arguments have entered the corporate governance debate. 
One of the most popular is the path-dependence theory that argues for the historical and socio-
political embeddedness of economic institutions, determining their working and effectiveness. 
The path dependence principle can be applied not only to the development of the corporation, but 
also to the development of its governing institutions, constrained by their own histories, and 
locked in self-enforcing development loops. The governance system is not expected to match 
performance and it remains unchanged in cases of both good and poor corporate performance. 
Attempts are made by investors to tied-up the interests of inside directors with corporate 
performance through incentive realignment. Overall the corporate governance mechanisms are 
seen as a bundle of monitoring, control, incentive realignment and shareholder activism, and it is 
recognised in the literature that there is a threshold below which investors are not capable to 
exercise any control, but can only exit. Shareholder activism to exercise monitoring and control 
over the corporate management (representing strong governance) is associated with both good 
and poor performance, and paradoxically accelerates monitoring and control costs which 
undermine corporate efficiency. The tension becomes evident in situations of crises when poor 
performance can not be explained by weak governance as shareholder activism is high (Ward and 
Rodriguez, 2004).  
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From institutional economics perspective weak governance may be a result of inadequate 
information, insufficient learning and knowledge creation, intransitive preferences of agents that 
obstruct innovation and adaptation, or particular relations affecting negatively the corporate 
activities. Most of these factors are not very easy to manage whatever shareholder intervention 
takes place. The outcomes depend very much on the good will and good practices established 
within the corporation, which depend on the cultural and relational context of the business. This 
clearly suggests that the governance mechanisms in multinational corporations will have a 
variable efficiency between the home country and the host countries. This creates additional 
difficulty to regulate governance reforms, as the governance mechanisms designed for MNCs 
need to have intrinsic flexibility that corresponds with the environmental and relational contexts 
in the host countries. 
 
The institutional environment affects not only corporate performance, but also Board 
performance, or the working of the governance institutions as well. The empirical research by 
Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) shows clearly that the power of outside directors to exercise a 
positive effect on the corporation is limited not only by the Chairman of the Board who 
effectively runs the Board and can manipulate discussions, but also by contextual factors such as:  
- personal capabilities and legitimacy,  
- the need to maintain a positive attitude in this collaborative settings,  
- political will and interpersonal skills in building Board coalitions,  
- the need to subscribe to norms and expectations that derive from the role of outside 
director,  
- the learning time required to grasp the complexity of the corporation, and  
- the interpersonal dynamics that emerge  as an outcome of the selection of board members 
(Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995).  
 
The effectiveness of the Board as a monitoring and control devise (or institution) is rather 
circumstantial. How agents adapt to these circumstances is essential, and the robustness of the 
governance institution may depend on it. Selecting Board members of MNCs is complicated not 
only by their personal constraints and capabilities, but also by establishing the complementarities 
of knowledge that different board members possess, and how adequate it is to technology 
innovation and foreign market entry in order to drive the developments in corporate activities. 
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Margaret Blair (1995a,b) launches her critique over the assumptions underpinning the current 
Corporate Governance paradigm from alternative perspective, revisiting the ownership rights and 
responsibilities issue under distributed control conditions. She describes the corporation as a legal 
structure that governs the relationships between all parties that make special investments in the 
wealth-creating activities of the firm. From this position the distribution of rents is negotiable 
between all claimants (suppliers, lenders, customers, employees) where the value of the 
specialized investments contributed by each party depends on the ongoing relationships between 
them. As a bundle of resources the financial capital is tied up to the human capital in corporations 
and it is not easy to attributed ownership to distinctive parts. Hence the corporate performance 
should be measured in a way to capture the real value-creation from all employed resources, 
rather then the value-restructuring through corporate takeovers, mergers, sell-offs, buy-outs and 
other asset-restructuring exercises undertaken by corporations and captured by the share price 
(Blair, 1995a).  Blair also concludes in a very eloquent statement that “…corporate governance 
discussions that start from a premise that shareholders are the sole ‘owners’ of the corporation, 
that measure wealth creation only in terms of the share price of corporate stock, and that focus 
only on the power relationship between shareholders and managers have the emphasis wrong. 
Reforms built on this premise may even destroy wealth-creating capacity” (Blair, 1995b, p.17). 
This statement does not include acknowledgement of the additional cultural and institutional 
differences that entangle the processes of the MNCs, and the value-creation and value distribution 
between home and host market economies. 
 
Another realistic view on the Anglo-American centered governance system points to the 
evolution of the financial instruments designed to diminish the value of corporate risk and debt 
through securitization, which takes off the balance sheet a number of critical performance 
indicators. Susan Bies (2002) in her speech refers to financial engineering and risk-management 
practices such as asset-backed commercial securitization, derivatives, options, futures, forwards, 
that transfer risk exposure outside the corporation, providing liquidity and reducing funding 
costs. In this environment of declining values of equity and debt, the new rules for disclosure of 
off-balance sheet transactions obviously aim to compensate for managerial ingenuity in hiding 
risk. At the same time there is already a pessimistic opinion that even the new rules can not 
guarantee full transparency due to the variable outcomes from risk-management techniques. 
 
Having raised all these criticisms, it is important to look at other alternative governance systems, 
and to compare the stability of relationships under different institutional arrangements. 
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Comparison of the Institutional Arrangements within the Stock-Market Capitalism and the 
Welfare Capitalism 
 
The literature on comparative governance systems is generally split into two streams. The first 
accepts the Anglo-American centric view that the most productive organizational form is the 
Multidivisional corporation (M-form), and the most effective form of corporate governance of the 
MNC is associated with the separation of ownership from control, financing through the stock 
market, and the use of independent Board of Directors. The other stream is looking at specific 
national institutional arrangements that facilitate the relationship between the corporation, 
investors, government, suppliers and customers, or the concept of the embedded corporation, as a 
network of affiliated wealth creating units, agents and institutions. 
 
Sanford Jacoby (2000) describes these two paradigms as ‘stock-market capitalism’ and the use of 
shareholder governance system (SGS) and ‘welfare capitalism’, and the use of relational-insider 
governance system (RIGS) that is based on dedicated capital and insider allocation of resources -
such as the systems in Japan and Germany. The strongest control device of the SGS is the exit by 
shareholders or independent directors (Jacoby, 2000), labelled as the ‘market for corporate 
control’ with its two-tiers (independent directors and shareholders). The notion of independent 
directors has emerged to control the behaviour of executive directors in order to protect investors’ 
interests. The strongest control device of the RIGS system is a strategic Board that comprises of 
representatives from investors with the largest holdings of corporate assets and management 
directors engaged in collaborative decision making. In the RIGS system shares are also held by 
key customers, suppliers, and allied corporations on a reciprocal basis (Jacoby, 2000), a fact 
acknowledged also in the literature as ‘alliance capitalism’ (Gerlach, 1992b).  
 
Jacoby (2000) explains the emergence of the two distinctive governance systems with the 
differences in the legal protection of ownership rights. In the Common Law countries such as US 
and UK the courts were effective in protecting investors’ rights against ‘monarchical’ (or state) 
expropriation, and against insider dealing. At the same time the Civil Law countries offered much 
weaker protection of ownership rights, and hence the tendency towards concentrated ownership 
and control by the Banks (Jacoby, 2000). Although this is a very convincing argument, it does not 
explain, for example, the differences between UK and US, i.e. the US system is geared much 
more towards litigation, while the UK system is oriented towards conciliatory practices (Philips, 
2002).   
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There seams to be an overwhelming opinion that in spite of some signs of convergence, the 
evolution of governance systems world-wide is shaped by national institutions and 
circumstances, and is taking off in separate directions. For example the current reforms in the US, 
led by Sarbanes & Oxley report put much emphasis on independent directors, even stricter rules 
for financial disclosure, and Chief Executives and financial directors to swear to the accuracy of 
their financial reports. At the same time, in the UK following the report by Higgs (Higgs, 2003), 
the emphasis has shifted towards professional qualities of the non-executive directors, and 
adopting voluntary codes of self—regulation, allowing corporations to adapt more gradually to 
changing stakeholder expectations (Economist, 2002).  To contrast this with the governance 
system in continental Europe, German Law puts responsibilities for the accounts on the 
Management Board, the Supervisory Board and the Auditors collectively, allowing the system to 
find a balance between the interests of investors sitting on the Supervisory Board, and the 
Executive Managers. In France the government and the public administration takes direct 
responsibilities to influence large French corporations through industrial policy measures.  
 
Although the role of institutional investors has increased throughout the world, it is also taking 
different forms. In Japan the largest public pension funds that manage over US$1.6 trillion have 
formed a Council of Public Institutional Investors, and are collectively discussing portfolio 
investment strategies and administration, managers’ evaluation techniques, new investment 
techniques, regulatory changes and fiduciary responsibilities, and cases of institutional investors 
in other countries (Feinberg, 2002). These collective efforts go far beyond the Council of 
Institutional Investors in the US, engaged primarily in monitoring and benchmarking of corporate 
performance and lobbying (Rodriguez & Ward, 2004). The Japanese Institutional Investors 
demonstrate willingness to share responsibilities both for shaping their institutional environment 
and moderating the risk of their portfolios – another example of optimizing behaviour contrasted 
with the maximizing objective in a classical competitive environment. 
 
It is evident that comparative analysis of corporate governance systems and practices enriches the 
academic framework that deals with the problems of corporate governance. However, much of 
the comparative research does not take into account deep enough the criticisms to the Anglo-
American corporate governance system either from the agency theory point of view, or from the 
institutional perspective. The convergence/divergence debate also has not been followed through 
systematically from Corporate Governance perspective. Jacoby (2000) argues that parallel to 
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converging business practices at the level of financing and control of MNCs, the institutional 
rigidities created by path dependence, the absence of a micro-economically superior model of 
corporate governance, the serious doubts about direct relationship between corporate governance 
and macroeconomic performance, create a platform for multiple development trajectories. The 
following part reviews two distinctive governing practices in the context of the Japanese system 
of ‘alliance capitalism’. The purpose of this comparison is to highlight two distinctive forms of 
governance of large networks that have evolved within a common institutional environment. 
 
The Japanese Keiretsu and Sogo-Shosha Corporate Networks 
Among the evidence of convergence between the ‘stock-market governing system’ and the 
‘relational-insider system’ are the changes that are taking place in Japan. These are: the large and 
liquid market for corporate equities, the governance reforms in the 90’s permitting a number of 
stock-market practices established in the US capital markets (such as equity swaps and stock 
purchases by corporations), and banks engaged in liquidating shareholdings (Jacoby, 2000). 
However, these changes are slow and superficial, as they do not lead to a radical transformation 
of the corporate governance system. Jacoby also reaches the conclusion that there are limits to 
convergence, and that a path which is locally efficient is not necessarily globally efficient. There 
are mechanisms which act as complementarities and substitutes in different historical and 
institutional settings. For example the very high innovation rates in Japan are a result of big-
company funding and corporate spin-offs, rather then venture capital like in the US (Jacoby, 
2000). If we consider that venture capital is one of the attributes of the stock-market capitalism 
then it is very difficult to explain that it has high profile in the US economy and its profile in the 
UK has diminished. This is evidence of divergence within rather then convergence across 
governance systems. Arguments about the superiority of one of the governance systems discussed 
above are difficult to sustain due to fundamental differences in the pace of economic growth. At 
the same time comparative research can identify specific governance mechanisms within each 
system that enhance efficient allocation of resources and effective control over the management 
of these resources. 
 
The aim further in this paper is to compare two Japanese cases of governance of corporate 
networks – the Keiretsu governance and the Sogo-sosha governance with the purpose to identify 
specific institutions and mechanisms within the welfare capitalism that facilitate economic 
growth and wealth creation.    
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Japanese zaibatsu / keiretsu 
The history of the big business groups in Japan keiretsu starts with their pre-war establishment as 
family-controlled business networks called zaibatsu, or giant trading conglomerates that ran most 
of pre-World War II Japanese industry. The historical Japanese family business zaibatsu 
resembled a closed intra-family corporation, where family investors were not able to take back 
their own investments, and some family businesses remained undivided for more than 300 years 
(Numazaki, 2000).  
 
As a form of business organisation, zaibatsu was controlled by a family council Shacho-kai, and 
the change of the number of partners took place only through family adoption, by marriage, or by 
birth and death. The difference in inheritance law in Japan and China, is perhaps one of the most 
significant factors historically that led to the consolidation of the family power in Japan and 
Korea, compared with its relative fragmentation in China or other countries with similar legal 
arrangements.  
 
The zaibatsu institution combined the wealth of rich merchant families, the organizing 
capabilities of warriors, and the expertise of university graduates in order to create large-scale 
family controlled conglomerates. Zaibatsu represented also a corporate network and was an 
organisational form, that emerged in response to market failures at the time of Japan's early 
industrialization after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 (Hirschmeier and Yui, 1981, Imai and Itami, 
1984, Lynn and Rao, 1995). The market failure at that time is described as the inability of capital 
markets to allocate efficiently resources to entrepreneurs because of the lack of an infrastructure 
to mobilize savings and to facilitate risk assessment for investment in new business ventures, 
especially, in industries such as mining, steel and shipbuilding (Lynn and Rao, 1995). Jacoby 
(2000) also puts forward the arguments that Japan, like Germany, France and other European 
countries experienced the pressures of late industrialisation catch-up, and the state played an 
active role to mobilise national resources in order to level up with already industrialised Britain. 
The relational governance system allowed the Japanese government to protect infant industries 
and to allow them to grow. Although with the development of Tokyo stock market an alternative 
mechanism of financing investment and growth was established, the old tradition prevail until the 
most recent consolidation across the financial sector in Japan. 
 
The new enterprise system in the 20th century comprised of narrowly focused and inter-linked 
factories, effective at transferring new technologies between the Western economies and the 
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Japanese economy (Imai, 1992), and possessing 'permeable boundaries' that enabled them to gain 
economies of scope (Fruin, 1992). Part of the system were the zaibatsu in-house 'organ banks', 
insurance and trust companies, that enabled the zaibatsu to overcome the weakness of the 
Japanese stock exchanges, and to mobilize and channel financial resources to entrepreneurial 
ventures (Lockwood 1954). The retained profits were allocated to new ventures through internal 
finance and budgeting systems, which facilitated endogenous growth.  
 
On the one hand, the zaibatsu controlled constituent units through stock held by the holding 
company, through centralized purchasing and sales functions, and through despatching directors 
to manage subsidiary units. The holding company exerted authority over the constituent units to 
reconcile incongruent goals and aspirations. On the other hand, the zaibatsu were market-like 
organizations to the extent that constituent units behaved independently and competed for 
resources, and some of them acted as entrepreneurial organizers of economic activity (Gerlach, 
1992a, Lynn and Rao, 1995). 
 
Fig. 2: Japanese Keiretsu Business Networks 
 
• Institution-centred 2-tier governance system 
• Multi-level boundaries of corporate units with interlocking ties 
• Resource & capabilities-based division of labour 
• Managing through co-ordinating interdependence 
 
In the post-War period, serious attempts to dismantle the Japanese holding companies were made 
by General MacArthur and the occupation forces in 1946. Subsequently, encouraged by 
Shacho-kai
First tier suppliers
Second tier suppliers
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government industrial policies, the reunification of formerly connected businesses through cross-
shareholding and mutual business dealings under the name of keiretsu took place. Many of the 
zaibatsu practices, traditions, and network formations were resurrected. 
 
The present Keiretsu networks comprise of close, long-term business relationships established by 
large corporations with selected groups of smaller firms, financial and trading institutions. They 
represent a web of overlapping financial, commercial, and governance relationships, initiated 
from a central core to pull-in large segments of the Japanese economy (Gerlach, 1992a, 1992b). 
Present Japanese inter-corporate keiretsu relationships are considered in terms of three different 
structural conditions to facilitate interactions: corporate groupings, financial centrality, and 
industrial interdependency through value chain activities. These groups are not conglomerates as 
the central holding companies are illegal under Japan's post-war commercial law. The companies 
are independent and publicly owned. However, they are linked through cross-shareholding 
investment and the exchange of personnel, through shared debt and equity, and mutual strategic 
plans. The strategic leadership resides within the presidents' club Shacho-kai, where implicit rules 
and shared understandings in unstated "gentlemen's agreements" lead to co-ordination and 
general co-operation for mutual benefit (Futatsugi, 1986, Kester, 1991, Gerlach 1992b, 
Shimotani, 1995, Tezuka, 1997). 
 
Shacho-kai as an institution represents the interests of the inner circle of the keiretsu as a clique 
of firms whose reciprocal commitments stem from long association and strong collective identity 
(Lincoln, et.al., 1996). This association of the presidents holds monthly meetings to discuss 
group strategy. It supports group solidarity, mediates intra-group activities, and settles intra-
group disagreements. Keiretsu members can thus develop plans based on activities that other 
keiretsu members are pursuing. Although it appears that Shacho-kai facilitates insider trading and 
may be called ineffective allocation of resources, it does provide an efficient platform for 
managing intra and inter-corporate relationships, which is a major contributor to wealth creation 
within the corporate group. 
 
Numerous firms lacking shacho-kai seats are also tied to the group through their financial and 
commercial transactions, and through various forms of monitoring and governance. For example, 
middle managers of keiretsu firms meet monthly to discuss operations and to co-ordinate 
corporate activities. This is another effective mechanism for intra-group knowledge management 
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that facilitates learning and innovation within the group, as well as sharing best practices on a 
wider scale. 
 
Other direct linkages within the keiretsu are represented by the stable corporate cross-
shareholdings, by dispatch of managers to insider director positions, and by director interlocking 
as control relations that are superimposed on the network of business dealings (Lincoln et.al., 
1996). All these mechanisms lead to alignment of interests among managers within the group and 
would strengthen the governance framework. In addition, these co-operative relations bring 
intrinsic value to the corporate network as they smoothen the internal negotiations between 
agents, and member firms. These relationships also facilitate co-ordination for innovation, 
development, and growth.  
 
Regarding the cross-shareholding within keiretsu networks, share ownership is a symbol of 
commitment and mutual obligation, rather than motivated by expectations of dividends and 
returns on investment (Tezuka, 1997). A typical keiretsu core company will have 20% to 40% of 
its stock owned by other companies within the keiretsu. Long-term shareholding agreements with 
other corporations create a situation whereby 60% to 80% of the keiretsu stock is never traded 
(Industry Week, 1992). As the stock market is not the main source of financing for the corporate 
group, this limited trading of shares of large Japanese multinational groups is not necessarily a 
detriment, but could be interpreted as a spare and underutilised mechanism that can be employed 
in cases of financial difficulties. 
 
In addition to these direct forms of relational governance, there are a number of other indirect ties 
that bond the commercial and investment activities within the keiretsu, such as: (1) the selection 
of keiretsu trading partners, (2) the amount of borrowing from group banks, (3) the extent of 
shareholding by group banks and corporations, (4) the selection of board members from the 
management of big leading firms (Lincoln, et.al., 1996). These represent specific governance 
mechanisms that enhance international operations, generating both internal and external 
synergies. 
 
Overall financial and commercial dependencies exist both ways: on the group banks for borrowed 
capital, and on the group manufacturers and trading firms as buyers and sellers of products and 
services. However, the ‘relational-insider’ governance system appears to be better equipped to 
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manage interdependencies, as it has established institutions, mechanisms and platforms for 
negotiations, information sharing and enhanced intra-corporate learning. 
 
There are numerous classifications of Japanese keiretsu, emphasizing on specific aspects of the 
network formation – vertical, horizontal, supplier-based, bank-centred. Overall there is an overlap 
between different categories, and most features are observed in each of the keiretsu. A supplier 
keiretsu is a vertical group of companies, centred along a major manufacturer, such as Sony, 
Honda, and Matsushita, which run multi-tier supplier networks. As an example of this form of 
business organisation Toyota has more than 60 percent of its parts and subsystems supplied by 
external contractors – tied in long-term contract relations, and Canon is outsourcing nearly 90 
percent of the value added components in its copiers to related companies (Industry Week, 1992). 
The vertical keiretsu represents formation that is highly vertically integrated along the value 
chain. It is held together by a complex mix of inter-linked people, financial resources, 
information flow, parts and product exchanges, and joint technology development agreements. 
Toyota has established a first-tier suppliers' group, the Kyoukoukai (176 companies); Nissan has 
its Takarakai (104 companies). Members of the vertical keiretsu have had little choice but to 
accept this combination of co-operation and competition. Vertical keiretsu is a way to create 
competitive teams of inter-linked suppliers, engaged in product and process development  
(Tezuka, 1997, Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998). This governance form delivers both cost 
efficiencies (within the supply network) and enhanced productivity from co-ordination of 
business activities, technologies and practices. 
 
Ownership is only a part of this linkage: most lead firms have minority shares in their suppliers. 
The lead firm encourages the second or third supplier to match the first supplier's cost and 
quality, often passing along important technical and process information on the first supplier's 
operations – a clear example of sharing competences and capabilities between competitors, which 
creates added value to the group. 
 
The lead firm tries to avoid monopoly power in its network, thus stimulating all suppliers to be 
more efficient and price competitive. Suppliers in the same keiretsu group co-operate in projects, 
and yet compete with each other and with outside suppliers to excel in quality, delivery, 
reliability, and cost performance (Tezuka, 1997). This dynamic is an evidence of the positive 
effect of managed expectations that creates collaboration among competitors, and can be 
attributed clearly to the ‘relational-insider’ governance system. 
 21
 
The bank-centred keiretsu are larger than the supplier-only keiretsu and include those headed by 
the four largest pre-war industrial groups or zaibatsu (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Fuyo) 
and the two major bank-centred groups, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Group and Sanwa Group. They are also 
called Mutual Insurance Systems (Tezuka, 1997). Their member companies come from a variety 
of industries, and they seek to integrate not only vertically, but also horizontally. Although there 
is a deep restructuring of these keiretsu groups triggered by the consolidation of the financial 
sector in Japan and the most recent merger of their group-banks, the literature has described 
sufficient details of their governance system at the pre-consolidation stage. Analysis of these 
governance practices is an important element of comparative research and an essential step 
towards monitoring of the impact of the financial consolidation on the keiretsu governance 
practices.  
 
Financial or horizontal keiretsu represent a two-tier corporate governance system, where 
corporations are linked together through an extensive network of corporate cross-shareholdings, 
and corporate members have close ties to a main bank. The keiretsu bank not only provides 
member firms with debt financing, but also owns a substantial amount of each firm's equity (Kim 
and Limpaphayom, 1998). 
 
In normal situations, usually the first stage of group governance intervention is in place, and 
corporate shareholders provide mutual monitoring through the linkages and institutions described 
above. When firms are performing well, keiretsu financial institutions do not restrain leverage 
levels, and keiretsu formations encourage cross-investment and collaboration among corporate 
members. Both corporate owners and managers take responsibilities for the higher leverage and 
for the expansion of trade credits and account receivables as a common source of short-term 
financing (Prowse, 1990, Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998). At this stage there is no significant 
relationship between ownership structure and financial leverage as banks approve and handle 
most transactions (Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998).  
 
In situation of crises and reduced profitability the keiretsu network reacts with a second-stage 
governance intervention. The bank assumes control to reduce debt, and acts as an ultimate 
disciplinarian (Hoshi, et.al., 1990). Keiretsu banks can reduce financial leverage levels of their 
member firms in several ways: (1) allowing interest concessions, (2) providing equity infusions, 
and/or (3) writing off outstanding loans. Financial institutions act as both debt- and equity 
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holders, and allow their member firms to carry more debt (Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998). The 
recent mergers of keiretsu banks are expected to have a positive impact towards increased 
financial discipline and reduced debt. This can reduce the banks’ bail-out powers, but it will not 
negate the other financial mechanisms that have been used in the past to assist group members in 
crisis situations. 
 
Shacho-kai membership ties, as well as trade, debt, and equity ties are stable relations that 
increase the possibilities for assistance when a partner firm encounters difficulties. Member 
companies usually maintain or even increase their equity in the troubled firm. Directors are 
transferred from the main bank and major trading partners to the firm's board to assist in strategic 
and operational decisions. Network suppliers and customers adjust their contracts to favour the 
target firm and transfer technical personnel to its operating divisions. Network members may in 
addition mandate exclusive purchases from the target firm's product line until the crisis has 
passed (Lincoln, et.al., 1996). Enhanced financial discipline as a result of the banking 
consolidation is expected to raise the criteria for assistance, but it does not change fundamentally 
the governance system, and may have a limited impact on these practices of cash-flow assistance. 
 
Keiretsu equalizes the fortunes of their members, smoothing inequality in financial returns across 
participating firms. Members are not able to maximise their benefits, i.e. extraction of profits and 
rents, but instead have been obliged to optimise output measures. Keiretsu networks are seen as 
clusters of large firms charging each other "efficient" prices (i.e., prices in line with their 
respective opportunity costs) while collectively extracting other market benefits through a 
collective action for maximizing the joint welfare of all member firms (Lincoln, et.al., 1996).  
 
Keiretsu members face lower risk than independent companies in Japan, because the whole 
keiretsu group shares individual risks. Keiretsu companies obtain lower interest rates from both 
keiretsu banks and other financial institutions, and tend to have higher debt ratios than either 
independent Japanese companies, or their U.S. counterparts (Tezuka, 1997). 
 
Keiretsu groups also claim to be an effective organisational system of minimising transaction 
costs, and reaping efficiency gains by economizing on information and control through 
regularized communication and exchange (Williamson 1985). They avert the threat of over-
organization by keeping their contractual arrangements implicit and their modes of monitoring 
and intervention informal and flexible (Lincoln, et.al., 1996). Keiretsu membership can be 
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interpreted as a ‘hedge against future failure’ (Aoki 1988:280). The advantages of keiretsu 
governance system are: their flexibility, adaptability, facilitated information and knowledge 
exchange, access to a range of alternative sources of financial assistance, and collaborative 
attitude to problem solving. These are an asset to the Japanese keiretsu groups not only in their 
home market, but also in their international operations. By integrating the political process within 
the system, keiretsu governance offers a valuable mechanism in building relationships with host 
governments in international business ventures, and other partner firms in multinational alliances, 
or with their foreign subsidiaries. 
 
Japanese Trading Networks - Sogo Shosha 
Japanese trading companies Sogo Shosha emerged since the 17th century and have further 
evolved from providing services as middlemen to their clients and keiretsu members to 
diversifying in different business areas with higher risk. In building diversified business 
portfolios they have settled as hubs in large business networks, controlling complex flows of 
resources. At various times shosha have acted as commission agents, importing and exporting on 
behalf of clients; as dealers, trading in their own right; as middlemen in transactions between 
members of a keiretsu network; as financiers, lending money to smaller keiretsu members; as 
facilitators and intermediaries in negotiations with foreign partners; and more recently as 
investment-trust managers, venture capitalists, and business consultants (The Economist, 1995). 
This description suggests that shosha represent the ultimate entrepreneurs, transforming every 
business opportunity into a profitable venture, relying both on own financial resources and 
raising capital from the stock market. 
 
Many shosha are relying on their expertise as oil traders, and are currently repositioning 
themselves from being traders to operators in infrastructure industries, such as electricity 
generation, telecommunications, television broadcasting, and even satellite communications. 
Their current metamorphosis means shedding their past ‘low- margin’ role as agents and petty 
financiers towards businesses with high profit margins. They often form alliances with foreign 
companies in preference to alternative keiretsu partners. Their networks of partners are much 
more multinational than traditional keiretsu.  
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Fig. 3: Japanese Sogo Shosha Business Networks 
 
• Intermediary-centred governance system utilising mixed ownership & 
connectivity role 
• Blurred ownership and control boundaries 
• Asset-based division of labour 
• Managing through controlled autonomy & controlled interdependence 
 
As hubs in their own business networks shosha have always held large shareholdings in other 
companies. Some of their investments represent shares in keiretsu firms (The Economist, 1995), 
some holdings are in their own independent subsidiaries (the shosha have generally preferred to 
run their own subsidiaries as non- core activities). Now shosha exhibit the new role of Venture 
Merchants. Each of the leading shosha has between 10 and 20 subsidiaries that are eligible to be 
listed on the Tokyo stock market. Share trading appears to be an attractive business for shosha, 
and a powerful mechanism for the growth of their business network. 
 
There is virtually no serious academic research on sogo shosha, and most of the information on 
their operations comes from daily press and business periodicals. However, they make a clear 
case of business growth through stock market operations where portfolio investment strategies 
are accompanied by commercial and business development strategies - all bundled under a 
holding formation. Although the holding company is illegal in Japan, and has not been very 
popular in countries with strong stock markets, it experiences a resurrection in developing 
markets. A holding company may reap synergies from building a large and loyal customer base 
and from cross-selling of group products and services (Gibson, 2002). A similar family holding 
company that demonstrates the case of shosha holding networks is the Ayala Corporation in the 
Philippines, which has benefited simultaneously from spinning-off subsidiaries, public trading, 
diversified acquisitions in high-growth market segments, alliance partnerships with MNCs, and 
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hedging risks and foreign depth through advanced financial instruments. Being entangled in 
multiple business relationships does not necessarily diminish the strong family control.  
 
The main governance mechanisms of the shosha holding networks appear to be: flexibility in 
financing both through own capital and using financial instruments available at the stock market; 
close hub-and-spoke co-ordination of  related as well as unrelated business operations; 
‘employing’ trust relations through family linkages or other informal associations between 
managers of individual businesses; actively using stock market financial instruments not only for 
enhancing their return on capital (ROC), but also for reinvestment of this capital in productive 
assets and business operations, and the endogenous growth of their business portfolio.  
 
Both cases of Keiretsu and Sogo Shosha resemble much more a holding formation, and offer two 
independent alternatives to the multidivisional form (M-form) of corporation with public limited 
liabilities and financed through trading on stock markets. Both cases demonstrate that the same 
socio-economic and institutional environment in Japan has nurtured two distinctive forms of 
governance, each of which offers different forms of bundling of ownership and control functions. 
Under the Keiretsu governance system there are two institutions engaged in monitoring and 
control, and both exercise ownership rights, and actively participate in strategic decision making 
and resource allocation. The Keiretsu Bank and the Presidents’ Association Shacho-kai are the 
main stock-holders that assume responsibilities and liabilities. Within the Keiretsu system they 
manage collectively the complex and multi-level network of corporate assets, utilising resource 
and capabilities based division of labour, interlocking resource ties, optimisation strategies, and 
co-ordination of interdependencies. 
 
The literature on Sogo Shosha does not give many details on the institutional arrangements of 
their governance system. However, from the scares descriptions of their operations we may 
induce that their governance system is centred in the trading firm, which utilises a mixed 
ownership and connectivity function, controlling and directing the trading operations of its 
subordinate assets. The trading firms itself have neither full ownership, nor full control of the 
independent firms under their sphere of influence. However, Shosha clearly generates value 
added by facilitating trading and operability of these firms. Its network incorporates asset-based 
division of labour which allows the centre trading firm to coordinate multi-level operations. 
Shosha’s relationships with its subordinate firms exhibit a mixed form of controlled autonomy 
and interdependence. 
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Clearly both cases demonstrate governance systems that generate economic efficiencies beyond 
the specialisation between owners and managers and the effective control over the managerial 
function. Re-bundling of ownership and control within the relational-insider system facilitates 
good reinvestment of capital into economic growth and creates a number of institutions that 
facilitate smooth negotiation of contract commitments and outcomes. The lack of transparency, 
attributed to this system may be associated with limited accountability, but it is also associated 
with effective intra-corporate information sharing, learning and innovation. 
 
Regarding their international operations, their governance flexibility and adaptability are a strong 
advantage compared with the MNC that originate from the Anglo-American stock-market 
system. The MNCs subject to the strict regulatory environment of the stock-market capitalism 
have evolved as a multidivisional form (M-form) of incorporation of subsidiaries, where full 
ownership and control is the most desirable relationship from the perspective of the ‘parent’ 
company. The network formation diminishes the costs of hierarchical control and coordination, 
and creates a more fluid structure of interlinked assets. On this basis it can be claimed that the 
governance costs of networks are lower compared with the M-form of corporation. Flexibility in 
financing investment and growth strategies is another advantage of network governance. Network 
formations also allow for more adaptable approach to managing relationships with subsidiaries, 
which will be a particular advantage in international operations. 
 
Conclusions 
Both Keiretsu and Sogo-Shosha resemble business networks coordinated from a centre that is not 
constrained by the division between major shareholders and executive managers. Shacho-kai is 
an institution developed to handle corporate responsibilities and strategic decision making. 
Shosha is a firm that is controlling both repetitive and market transactions, and is engaged 
directly and indirectly in operations management. Both cases exhibit a form of re-integration of 
the ownership and control function. How does this apply to MNCs and global business networks? 
 
The MNCs have to handle and control multiple transactions in remote locations adopting a 
variety of co-ordination mechanisms – most of which have been invented for the purpose of 
effective administration and management of economic activities in organizations and institutions. 
The complexity of MNC operations requires a complex set of tools used by individual and 
collective agents – all engaged in a complex allocation of resources for operational and strategic 
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purposes. In this context the discussion of the decision making power of the individual members 
of the Board of Directors, or the accountability of insider agents to outsider shareholders and 
stakeholders merely reaches the paradox that there are no boundaries to managerial opportunism, 
and enhanced control that assumes tentative opportunism, generates merely more sophisticated 
evasive manoeuvres from executives entrusted to handle operational risks.  
 
Collaborative governance demonstrates an alternative way for re-alignment of interests of all 
economic actors, and shortens the cycle for reinvestment of capital into productivity and growth, 
compared with the portfolio investment mechanism within the stock-market governance system. 
It facilitates information sharing, learning and innovation that ultimately brings comparative 
advantage to an MNC, 
 
Ownership rights do not produce automatically enhanced accountability or ethical behaviour. 
Both of these outcomes require institutional support from a social canvas that evolves historically 
and in a particular legal and socio-economic context. Governance mechanisms taken out of this 
context may not work and may not be applicable to other systems. In addition to that, systemic 
changes are always costly to implement, and require radical approach.  
 
This comparative analysis of the governance mechanisms that have evolved under the ‘relational-
insider’ governance system  illuminates some of the advantages of an economic system that have 
facilitated rapid growth and rapid internationalisation particularly after the Second World War. 
The criticisms of the welfare governance have been usually raised from a narrow perspective. 
This paper has widened the analytical scope with the synthesis of the critical arguments from 
agency theory and institutional economics perspective (Fig. 1). The proposed conceptual 
framework can explain why certain elements of the welfare governance bring competitive 
advantage at firm level. 
 
Further research into the governance mechanisms behind Sogo-shosha is essential in order to 
explain the success of this form of business growth. The growing popularity of holding 
companies in the rapidly developing economies is evidence of the importance of this corporate 
form for growth and wealth creation. Most of the governance mechanisms discussed in the paper 
are subject to evolution, particularly under the influence of the on-going consolidation of the 
financial sector in Japan, and the changes in the regulatory environment. The existing research on 
Keiretsu governance will need updating in the context of the recent merger wave across Keiretsu 
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group banks. Comparative and longitudinal analysis is expected to enlighten the debate not only 
on systemic changes in Japan, but also on global convergence, and the conceptual framework in 
this paper is an effort to present a systematic view on the factors that affect corporate governance 
outcomes.     
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